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Key Insights:
•

India, as an emerging global power, increasingly is focused on issues that transcend
the traditional South Asian region. U.S. policy, though, still tends to view India and its
interests through precisely such a lens. Among the most important future developments
will be the “de-hyphenation” of India from the rest of South Asia, and speciﬁcally
Pakistan.

•

Indo-U.S. relations have clearly improved in the post-Cold War era, particularly in the
area of military-to-military operations. This can provide an important platform from
which relations in other ﬁelds can advance.

•

While relations between India and the United States have doubtlessly improved, the
war on terrorism presents a series of obstacles to realizing fully the potential of the
Indo-U.S. relationship, despite common interest in a number of key areas. This is likely
to be the case as long as Pakistan remains the key regional ally of the United States.

On April 21-23, 2005, the India Studies Program at Indiana University hosted a conference
aimed at assessing the current state of Indo-U.S. relations. More than 20 scholars, policymakers, and
military leaders attended the conference, and provided a number of viewpoints on the evolution
of the relationship between the two countries. In particular, conference attendees focused on
issues pertaining to strategic cooperation and questioned whether we are, in fact, witnessing the
convergence of grand strategies between two states that have traditionally maintained tenuous
security links.
Opening remarks set the tone for the remaining sessions of the conference by highlighting
a dominant theme that would temper future discussions among participants. Speciﬁcally, most
members of the world community have tended to assume that India’s interests are limited to the
South Asian region, despite obvious signs that India is emerging as a global power. Efforts on
the part of New Delhi to move beyond the simple view that Indian politics are determined by
its relationship with its neighbors, and more speciﬁcally with Pakistan, have both complicated
previously held assumptions about India on the part of foreign powers and unnecessarily
constrained Indian policymakers as they attempt to develop their state’s economic and political
potentials. Hence, the tensions that have often accompanied Indo-U.S. relations are as much a

result of both countries’ worldviews as they are the
consequence of divergent geo-political objectives.
The opening session of the conference provided
an overview of the developing strategic relationship
between the United States and India. At root, the
ﬁrst presenter argued that India’s status as the
world’s largest democracy and the U.S. position as
the world’s oldest and most powerful democratic
state have little to do with Indo-U.S. relations.
Rather, he contended that strategic factors have
played the dominant role in determining the course
of relations, and that there were several “lost
opportunities” for cooperation in the 1940s and
1950s that tempered future discussions between
the two countries. To a great extent, these lost
opportunities were the consequence of Cold War
calculations and historical exigencies that caused
U.S. policymakers to eschew India’s professed
status as a nonaligned state. With the collapse of
the Soviet Union, these dynamics were largely
eliminated. Nevertheless, the ﬁrst presenter (and
subsequent commentators) focused on two other
issues that continue to bedevil bilateral relations:
India’s possession of nuclear weapons, and the role
of Pakistan. Consistent with the overarching theme,
both of these issues tend to keep India conﬁned in
the minds of American policymakers as a mere cog
in a South Asian puzzle, rather than as an emerging
global power with considerable economic potential,
a large and technologically advanced military, and
a blossoming space program.
At least three of the commentators agreed
that, despite these historical differences, we are
witnessing a “turning point” in Indo-U.S. relations,
marked by India’s advances in these areas coupled
with what one observer termed a convergence of
interest in the area of “anti-Jihadism.” The potential
for future joint action and the question of whether
the two states can ﬁnd common ground in their
respective geo-strategic plans formed the basis for
the remaining sessions.

perception in Washington that India’s professed
neutrality masked sympathies for the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. General Claude
Kicklighter’s 1991 visit to India, and subsequent
agreements to develop joint training exercises,
marked the ﬁrst military-to-military cooperation
between the United States and India. In 1995,
cooperation was further strengthened by Secretary
of Defense William Perry’s visit to India, where he
and his Indian counterpart agreed to move beyond
bilateral military issues to encompass a wide range
of military, security and strategic interests. These
advances were imperiled by India’s 1998 nuclear
tests and the subsequent sanctions imposed by the
United States. But the foundation for cooperation
remains, owing in large part to both countries’
desire to remain positively engaged, as exempliﬁed
by the Jaswant Singh―Strobe Talbott dialogues.
Conference attendees noted that the new security
environment after September 11, 2001 (9/11),
with its attendant issues such as drug and arms
trafﬁcking, terrorism, and insurgency, requires a
plan that moves beyond unilateral or even bilateral
approaches. At least one commentator noted that
this presents a sterling opportunity to advance
Indo-U.S. relations by emphasizing India’s role in
the global, as opposed to the South Asian, polity.
Such an effort at “de-hyphenating” India from
Pakistan, while important from the perspective of
India, might be complicated by divergent views of
strategic culture. Several commentators suggested
that while military-to-military relations have
paved the way for future relations, Indian attitudes
towards the deployment of force, coupled with its
unwillingness to imperil its strategic autonomy,
may require that we move beyond a military
relationship and “embed military relations into a
broader bilateral relationship” that is predicated
on what one panelist termed “intangible” activities.
Few panelists agreed on what these intangible
factors would consist of, but they generally agreed
with the sentiment that it was critical for Indo-U.S.
relations to be characterized by something more
than “engagement for engagement’s sake.”
The next three sessions highlighted the ways that
this evolution can take place. In the context of global
peacekeeping operations, the post-9/11 security
environment has highlighted the importance of both
human security and political stability as necessary
ingredients to stop insurgencies that can foster

From Military-to-Military to Peacekeeping.
Building on the initial comments, presenters
in the next session focused on military-to-military
relations and agreed that the post-Cold War era
presented opportunities for cooperation that were
historically impossible, owing to persistent U.S.
support for Pakistan from 1954 onward and the
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terrorism. To this end, both India and the United
States are in a position to contribute to peacekeeping
missions, although contributors diverged in their
assessments of force readiness to accomplish these
goals. In particular, the question of whether the U.S.
military will soon be in a position to make peace
and stability operations a viable component of its
mission must still be answered. Nevertheless, at
least one commentator noted that the overarching
visions of both Washington and New Delhi are not
inconsistent in terms of peacekeeping operations
and that both states must readily concede that their
long-term security is, in part, tied to the stability
of other nations where new security threats can
develop.

institutions.” India will continue to be rankled by
the withholding of dual-use technologies although
this frustration will be tempered by the elimination
of key sanctions, coupled with the development of
routine bilateral consultations. Thus, at least one
contributor suggested that while limitations on
strategic trade may prevent the two states from
becoming the “natural allies” that many feel they
should be, it is certain that there will never be fullﬂedged enmity between them.
Counterterrorism Cooperation.
The third area where Indo-U.S. relations can
advance beyond bilateral military cooperation is
counterterrorism. Clearly, both countries have a
vital interest in limiting the scope of international
terror. The 9/11 attacks on the United States and the
December 2001 attacks in India reﬂect a common
interest in minimizing the threat posed by organized
terror groups. Prior to 9/11, U.S. policymakers
tended to view terrorism solely as a “threat to U.S.
interests abroad.” To this end, the United States
was unwilling to list Pakistan as a state sponsor
of terrorism. As noted by several participants, the
refusal to sanction Islamabad appropriately for
its blatant support of terror groups operating on
Indian soil was viewed as hypocritical by Indian
policymakers. From the U.S. perspective, however,
the long history of “tit-for-tat” strikes between
India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue reduced
interservice intelligence (ISI)-sponsored attacks to a
product of bilateral tensions as opposed to a case of
international terrorism. The U.S. relationship with
Pakistan in the weeks and months following 9/11
was a source of considerable consternation to India,
although, as one participant argued, the distaste
associated with U.S. cooperation with Pakistan
was ameliorated by U.S. insistence that Pakistani
militants operating in Kashmir were engaging
in international terrorism. Moreover, in light of
common threats, both the United States and India
have engaged in joint counterinsurgency exercises
and information sharing.
Despite some participants’ optimistic outlook on
Indo-U.S. cooperation in the realm of counterterror,
at least one panelist argued that there will continue
to be inconsistencies between the stated objectives
of the war on terror and U.S. policies towards
Pakistan. According to this perspective, the Bush

Dual Use Technologies.
In terms of strategic trade, contributors noted
that while India considers the issue of hightechnology trade, particularly in the area of
dual-use technologies, to be a critical measure
of Indo-U.S. security relations, the United States
necessarily is constrained by its fears of potentially
escalating nuclear tensions on the subcontinent. At
the same time, one presenter argued that, despite
the imposition of sanctions following India’s
1998 nuclear tests, the legislation enforcing these
measures began to crumble almost instantly as new
laws providing a series of sweeping exemptions
from the Glenn Amendment were passed quickly.
While these exemptions and the September 2001
lifting of sanctions represented a tremendous
change in strategic trade, dual-use technologies
were still off the board. This presents a considerable
problem for both political and economic reasons.
First, U.S. refusal to budge on the issue hinders
Indo-U.S. relations to the extent that India perceives
Washington’s willingness to concede to strategic
trade as a critical barometer of its trust in New Delhi.
Second, as the presenter noted, India’s domestic
civil nuclear program has reached a plateau that is
unlikely to be breached without an infusion of foreign
technologies. Ironically, the presenter observes that
while India’s nuclear program will likely remain at
its present level, its missile/space programs continue
to advance unabated, a development of less concern
since “it is organizationally much easier to separate
the civilian and military (missile/space) programs,
not least because they are run by two different
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administration’s second term will focus on three
key foreign policy goals: the continuation of the
war on terror, the prevention of future attacks of the
caliber of 9/11, and the denuclearization of Iran. For
each of these goals, the cooperation of Pakistan will
be more critical than that of New Delhi. Hence, this
panelist questioned the degree to which Indian and
U.S. goals will dovetail. While the overarching goals
of both states are similar, wide disagreements about
how to best implement them exist.

*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of
the author and do not necessarily reﬂect the ofﬁcial
policy or position of the Department of the Army,
the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
This conference brief is cleared for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
*****

Toward a U.S.-India Entente?

More information on the Strategic Studies
Institute’s programs may be found on the Institute’s
Homepage at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/
or by calling (717) 245-4212.

Ultimately, Indo-U.S. relations can be best
characterized as improving within a rapidly
changing global polity. The last commentator
described the current relationship as an “evolving
entente,” capturing the present state as an informal
set of shared understandings between two powerful
countries with many common interests. While the
present relationship is certainly not an alliance, it
represents a vast improvement over years past where
a combination of geo-political differences and ColdWar realities conspired to create an atmosphere
of signiﬁcant tension between both states. Most
panelists agreed that Indo-U.S. relations are at a high
point, particularly in terms of military-to-military
operations. At the same time, several commentators
stressed the fact that U.S. policymakers are only
beginning to see India as an emerging global power
whose interests extend beyond the South Asian
region. One panelist noted that this has as much
to do with bureaucratic inertia than any other
factor, and that many U.S. policymakers are strong
advocates of “de-hyphenating” India and Pakistan.
At the same time, this caveat must still be considered
in the long-term U.S. interest in the war on terror.
Given the reality of on-going tensions between
New Delhi and Islamabad, as well as the continuing
importance of Pakistan to U.S. counterterrorism
efforts, Washington is unlikely to realize the full
potential of the U.S.-India security relationship, at
least in the near- to mid-term.
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